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 In recent years Giorgio Agamben within his “Homo Sacer” project 
has elaborated the theory of “two ontologies”, in which his challenging and 
crucial assumption was the juxtaposition of the ontology of ἐστi (to be or is)  
to the ontology of ἔστω (ought). At first glance, this central claim of 
Agamben can be seen as innocent and neutral for any kind of philosophical 
discourse. However, His archeological investigation of the concepts of duty 
and commandment turns out to be the mere preliminary stage for his 
explosive hypothesis, according to which ontological machine and entire 
philosophical tradition of the west oppressed and ignored the so called modal 
ontology of commandment. The main aim of this article is to ascertain the 
meaning, field and function of non-apophanitic discourse, which can be 
placed beyond propositional truth and falsity. We are going to analyze three 
forms of non-apophantic discourse, namely, prayer, commandment and oath 
which according to their essence, is linked to the modal ontology. Another 
purpose is to demonstrate that in modern structurally differentiated and 
secularized societies, non-apophantic logos is a concealed form and source 
of power. 
 




 In the winter semester of 1929-1930 Martin Heidegger delivered a 
lectures which bears the title: “Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-
endlichkheit-einsamkeit” and in the paragraph of 72 he referred to 
apophantic-logos and to its relation to prayer. This section of the book then 
will become the matter of reflection for Jacques Derrida in his seminars 
entitled “Beast and Sovereign”, in which he tried to deconstruct Giorgio 
Agamben’s distinction of Zoe and Bios, and the connection of bare life to the 
sovereign decision. Heidegger making the distinction between man and 
animal in that particular text by declaring that animals are essentially “zoion 
alogon” had to use Aristotelian distinction of apophantic and non-apophantic 
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utterances. Derrida analyzing this passage from Heidegger writes, “Prayer, 
for its part, a human thing, is a logos semantikos but not apophantikos, it 
speaks but could neither lie nor tell the truth. A prayer says nothing that 
could mislead. It cannot and could not be shown to be false. . . .  The logos 
apophantikos, for its part, is also human discourse, but one that can always 
mislead and lie. The logos apophantikos can speak the truth and make the 
truth only by withdrawing from deceit, lying and retreat, or even from error 
as such” (J. Derrida 2009: 230). 
 Heidegger did not refer to non-apophantic logos, which for Derrida is 
quite crucial, which means that for him logos apophantikos is determined by 
non-apophantic logos. According to Michael Naas “Heidegger seems to have 
forgotten, says Derrida in an aside, that “even the enunciative proposition, 
insofar as it is addressed to someone, indicates some prayer, a ‘listen to me, I 
say to you’” (BS 2 217/304). Hence, Derrida can suggest contra Heidegger, 
or contra this Heidegger, that a certain prayer, a certain performative of 
prayer, is at the origin of all discourse, constative as well as performative. 
And all this, recall, will have been motivated in large part by Heidegger’s 
attempt to distinguish the beast from the sovereign, to show that “the animal 
is alogon . . .  it can neither speak, nor pray, nor lie” (M. Naas 2015: 118). 
  
Archeology of non-apophantic logos and commandment: 
 Once Giorgio Agamben noticed, that philosophical archeology as a 
methodological tool is the shadow directed from the present to past. In case 
of Foucault, this shadow lasted to 17th and 18th centuries. For Agamben this 
shadow is longer and goes back to medieval and ancient intellectual 
history.117  
 In recent years Giorgio Agamben within his “Homo Sacer” project 
has elaborated the theory of “two ontologies”, in which his challenging and 
crucial assumption was the juxtaposition of the ontology of ἐστi (to be or is)  
to the ontology of ἔστω (ought). At first glance, this central claim of 
Agamben can be seen as innocent and neutral for any kind of philosophical 
discourse. However, His archeological investigation of the concepts of duty 
and commandment turns out to be the mere preliminary stage for his 
explosive hypothesis, according to which ontological machine and entire 
philosophical tradition of the west oppressed and ignored the so called modal 
ontology of commandment. 
  Agamben assumes that despite the concealment of this ontology of 
commandment, it has been functioning as latent form of political power. By 
unveiling the structure of imperative and identifying it with the source of 
                                                          
117 See: Giorgio Agamben: IL Regno e La Gloria: Per una genealogia teologica 
dell’economia e del governo, Neri Pozza Editore, 2007. 
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power, Agamben evokes and brought back to philosophical reasoning 
Aristotle’s notion concerning non-apophantic discourse, which he developed 
in “De Interpretatione” and which can be also easily compared to speech acts 
theory. According to Aristotle, “Every sentence is significant, but not every 
sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is 
truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer (εὐχὴ) is 
a sentence but is neither true nor false” (Arist; De Interpr. 16b33.)  Non-
apophantic discourse does not reveals, shows or demonstrates something 
which can be true or false, rather it is a singular self-manifestation, which is 
neutral and indifferent to binary opposition of logic and can be placed 
beyond propositional truth or falsity.   
 There are several forms of singular expressions, which structurally 
are very similar to performative utterances such as an oath, prayer, curse, 
advice, suggestion and of course imperative or commandment. Imperative 
does not refer to objective world, it lacks the force of denotation and the 
description. Agamben stated, “One understands, from this perspective, why 
juridical-religious formulas (of which the oath, command and prayer are 
eminent examples) have a performative character; if the performative, by the 
single fact of being uttered actualizes its own meaning, this is because it does 
not refer to being but to having-to-be. It presupposes an ontology of esto and 
not of esti” (G. Agamben 2013: 119). 
 What connects one of the most significant concept of the western 
metaphysical thought “beginning” (ἀρχή) to the commandment? In old 
Greek language ἀρχή designated both, commandment and the beginning 
respectively. According to Giorgio Agamben, the verb ἄρχω expresses the 
commencement of something by someone, ἄρχων designated the person who 
gave the order (commandment), and by doing this, something new had been 
started. This identification of commandment and the beginning gives to 
Agamben a chance to make a radical claims and theoretical assumptions, 
which is typical for him. According to Agamben commandment was always 
linked to the beginning. “In the beginning (ἐν ἀρχῇ) God created the heavens 
and the earth” [Exodus. 1:1].  An act of creation is intertwined with the will, 
as well as with commandment, because God said “Let there be light! 
(γενηθήτω φῶς)  and there was light [Exodus. 1:.3]. Moreover, Agamben 
takes much more radical step further by assuming the possibility of different 
translation and understanding of the opening words of John’s Gospel. It is 
clear, that Agamben plays here and makes an anti-dogmatic decision in order 
to pave the way for his own discourse. “In the beginning was the Word (ἐν 
ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγο), and the Word was with God” [John 1.1], can be understood 
in a different way. If we assume that instead of the “beginning” was 
“commandment”, it turns out to be that “in the commandment was the 
word”.   
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 According to Agamben, in the western philosophical tradition in 
contrast to the phenomenon of obedience, systematic and intentional 
reflection on the commandment never took place. He named the work of La 
Bouasie “De Discours de la Servitude Volontaire“, in which the reflection on 
commandment was absolutely missed.  However, it would be hard to agree 
with the critique of Agamben, because “voluntary slavery” does not implies 
by necessity the notion of commandment.  
 Commandment belongs to the category of non-apophantic discourse 
and nothing in an objective world corresponds to it.  An imperative act does 
not disclose truth or falsity; rather it is a type of elocutionary utterance, 
which is well known by Austin’s theory of speech acts. If an imperative “go” 
or “walk” does not tell us something on the subject and therefore is out of the 
binary system of truth and falsity, its only function and purpose is the force 
of utterance itself and resulted consequences, which are produced by this 
event. If we substitute an imperative with the third personal indicative, we 
will have an example of Aristotle’s apophantic discourse. “X is going” could 
be true (if this person is really going) or false (if he is not walking).  
Apophantic discourse refers to the state of things, to the world on which 
something could be said. It reveals the condition and nature of that particular 
subject. An imperative “walk” is non-descriptive utterance, which does not 
refer to being and its different regions. 
 “The order, for instance, given by an officer to his soldiers, is 
accomplished, is perfect, by the mere act of its utterance. The fact that the 
soldiers obey or disobey does not put in question the validity of the 
commandment. The commandment is perfect in its mere utterance. We must 
therefore admit that the commandment does not refer to something existing. 
Nothing in the world as it is could respond to the imperative. And this is why 
people say that the imperative does not imply, does not refer to an “is”, but 
rather to an “ought”…”  
 “Power is not defined only by its capacity to be obeyed but, first of 
all, by its capacity to give orders and commandments, even if those orders 
are not totally obeyed. A power does not fall when it is no more obeyed or 
completely obeyed, but when it ceases to give orders. A power, [which] 
continues to give order [s], will always find someone, perhaps a few persons 
that will obey. But if a power ceases, if it is unable to give orders, this the 
only moment when a power [will] collapse” (G. Agamben 2013: 31-32). 
 This quoted passage is problematic. Is it possible to imagine or 
conceive of an imperative independently, without obedience and 
completeness of an action? How legitimate is to consider as a holder of 
power Strategos or officer whose orders are no longer in force, no one obeys 
his commandments and nobody wants to fulfil an ordered task? Is he the real 
officer or not? Agamben thinks that power is no longer the power; it ceases 
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to be a power as such, when it rejects to issue a new orders or 
commandments. However, this thought is problematic, because if being 
rejected and refuted, power still maintains its force, what consequences  we 
will face in case of general non-violent strike?  In that non-violent general 
strike imperatives, orders and legal regulatory system of norms are 
temporally suspended and do not have a force in order to exert an influence 
due to the unwillingness of those, who are no longer obeys. If we assume 
that power, will reproduce itself and will find out the ways of its realization 
we will inevitably obtain the paradoxical result. Unfortunately, Agamben 
does not refers to the general strike and civil disobedience; it would be 
interesting how efficacious will be the relation of power and commandment 
in the condition of its absolute neutralization. However, Agamben is oriented 
on the investigation of the modality and semantic meaning of the 
commandment and following the steps of Aristotle, he places this singular 
commandment under the category of non-apophantic logos.  What is an 
intention of Agamben will become clear by analyzing the modal dimension 
of an imperative.  
 As we have already noticed imperative does not have any descriptive 
function. For the description of something, it should refer to the present 
temporal mode and to the state of things. However, it does not imply 
something, which is said by the verb “to be”; rather it is directed towards the 
future to come and its modality. Imperative aims not at the actual presence, 
but at the coming modal future. In order to determine and ascertain the 
meaning and essence of an imperative, Agamben evokes the works of Emile 
Benveniste and Antoine Meillet. According to Meillet, there exists a 
morphological similarity between the verb in indicative form and imperative. 
Due to this Meillet assumes that imperative could be the primitive and 
primordial form of the verb.118  According to Benveniste “imperative is non-
denotative and the purposes of it is not the expression of content. Rather it 
has pragmatic character and its aim is to exert the influence on the listener” 
(G. Agamben 2013: 42). Agamben is real archeologist, who excavated and 
discovered many conceptual artefacts, which were abandoned and forgotten. 
He found out very interesting definition of the imperative in Benveniste. 
According to Benveniste imperative is the “nude semanteme” (le sémantème 
nu) which expresses the pure ontological relation between world and 
language.119  Therefore, imperative which describes nothing guides as into 
the field of non-apophantic logos. In which it represents itself as self-
manifested phenomenon. Imperative transmits and shows only itself. Which 
kind of ontological relation means Agamben? If imperative does not refer to 
                                                          
118 See: Giorgio Agamben. Opus Dei: An Archeology of Duty, Stanford University Press, 
2013, page 118. 
119 See: Giorgio Agamben. What Is to Rule? GRUNDRISSE, 2013, 42. 
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something, which “is”, on what type of ontology are we speaking about? 
“Imperative does not describe the relation of language and the world; rather 
it governs and reign over them”. (G. Agamben 2013: 44).  It refers to the 
modal verb “must”, or to the expression “let it be”, which founds or gives 
birth to something. According to its structure imperative has performative 
character and it possess the perlocutionary force of utterance. Agamben, by 
doing his archeological investigations gradually get closer to his aim, that is 
to say to the disclosure of the secret source of power and take glimpse on the 
functioning of entire western political apparatus. 
 Risky and provocative hypothesis of Agamben refers to the status 
and determination of ontology. According to him, western cultural and 
philosophical tradition knows two different ontologies, which paradoxically 
intertwines with each other. Agamben calls fists ontology as apophantic 
ontology, which is by its nature indicative. The second is an ontology of 
commandment, which is imperative. Binary system of ontology is 
constituted by indicative and imperative. To the first ontology corresponds 
Greek „ἐστi“, and to the second „ἔστω“.  According to Agamben, an 
ontology of “to be” functions in the philosophic and scientific discourse, 
whereas imperative ontology of “esto” acquires its power and meaning in the 
field of morality and religion and governs them. What then Agamben does 
may seem to be the concrete manifestation of theoretical violence over the 
foundational formula of western metaphysical tradition. However, his main 
aim is not the distortion of something but the representation of an ambivalent 
machine of the western ontology. As we have already noticed, western 
culture entirely abandoned the ontology of commandment, which according 
to Agamben’s assumption have been remaining latent and governing 
structure of philosophical and political paradigm of the west. Agamben has 
altered one word from Parmenides’s poem and obtains different meaning.  
Parmenides’s formula „ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι“has been changed by “there is indeed 
being” “let there be being”. 
 “That in our contemporary societies the ontology of commandment is 
not only eroding the primacy of the ontology of the ἐστi but also slowly 
overcoming and replacing it. This means that, in a sort of returning of the 
repressed, religion, magic and law [and all] the domain of non-apophantic 
logos, which has been neglected and pushed in the background, are secretly 
beginning to govern the function of our secularized society. In our so-called 
democratic societies commandment[s] are given usually in the form of 
advice, suggestion, invitation, advertising, or you’re asked by reason of 
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security to co-operate, and people do not realize that these are just 
commandments disguised in the form of suggestion, advice...” 120 
 Genealogical and archeological investigations of Agamben 
eventually links with each other the phenomenon of the commandment and 
non-apophantic logos.  
 
The Oath as non-apophantic logos 
 An oath is another form of non-apophantic logos, which was one of 
the central problems for the construction of the speech acts theory. Oath was 
politically laden phenomena, for example according to Lycurgus "The power 
that holds together [to synechon] our democracy is the oath" (G. Agamben: 
2011, 2) and according to the neoplatonic philosopher Hierocles “We have 
previously shown that the law [nomos] is the always uniform operation by 
means of which God eternally and immutably leads everything to existence. 
Now we call oath [horkos] that which, following this law, conserves 
[diaterousan] all things in the same state and renders them stable in such a 
way that, as they are held in the guarantee of the oath and maintain the order 
of the law, the immutable stability of the order of creation is the completion 
of the creating law" (G. Agamben. 2011: 3). Both quoted passages 
concerning the essence and the function of the oath are very similar with 
each other. In both cases the oath does not have constitutional power, it does 
not creates something. “The oath does not create anything, does not bring 
anything into being, but keeps united [synecho] and conserves [diatereo] 
what something else (in Hierocles, the law; in Lycurgus, the citizens or the 
legislator) has brought into being” (G. Agamben, 2011: 3). An oath does not 
refer to the semiotic and cognitive functions of the proposition; rather it just 
provides effectuality of utterance and its claims on truth. Philo of Alexandria 
in his “allegorical interpretations” which was cited by Agamben wrote that, 
"Now men have recourse to oaths to win belief, when others deem them 
untrustworthy [apistoumenoi, lacking in pistis, that is, in credibility]". (G. 
Agamben 2011: 4).  It is clear from that passage that the oath has been using 
due to the enhancing the credibility of assertion, because it does not refer to 
the state of affairs therefore it could not be considered as criterion for truth 
and falsity. It is another problem. If in the moment of swearing one is not 
going to fulfil his self-imposed obligations.  
 Maybe an intention of one who swears is not the keeping of promise 
at all. Anyway, its main force is the produced effect, or effectuality as such. 
Let my quote another passage from allegorical interpretation “You mark that 
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God swears not by some other thing, for nothing is higher than He, but by 
Himself, who is best of all things. Some have said, that it was inappropriate 
for Him to swear; for an oath is added to assist faith [pisteos eneka] and only 
God ... is faithful [pistos]. ... Moreover, the very words of God are oaths [hoi 
logoi tou theou eisin horkoz]… No, we may be content if we are able to 
swear by his name, which means (as we have seen) the interpreting word 
[tou ermeneos logou]” (G. Agamben 2011: 20). According Philo, there is no 
interval between God’s saying and creating, he writes “God spoke and it was 
done, with no interval between the two rho theos legon ama epoiei],) the oath 
of men is thus the attempt to conform human language to this divine model, 
making it, as much as possible, pistos, credible.” (G. Agamben 2011: 21). 
Philo in this context seems to be the something like an ancestor of speech 
acts theory, despite the fact that he was operating in the field of exegetical 
theology. Therefore, an oath is non-apophantic logos, moreover non-
apophantic also implies that it has some performative character, it refers to 
something, which should be. Here there is not divergence or split between 
ontology and praxis, between ousia and oikonomia, which emerged in the 
writings of the church fathers. “The econ- omy through which God governs 
the world is, as a matter of fact, entirely different from his being, and cannot 
be inferred from it. It is possible to analyze the notion of God on the 
ontological level, listing his attributes or negating, one by one--as in 
apophatic theology-all his predicates to reach the idea of a pure being whose 
essence coincides with existence. But this •will not rigorously say anything 
about his relation to the world or the way in which he has decided to govern 
the course of human history” (G. Agamben 2007: 70). 
 “[The oath] is a particular modality of assertion, which supports, 
guarantees, and demonstrates, but does not found anything. Individual or 
collective, the oath exists only by virtue of that which it reinforces and 
renders solemn: a pact, an agreement, a declaration. It prepares for or 
concludes a speech act which alone possesses meaningful con- tent, but it 
expresses nothing by itself It is in truth an oral rite, often completed by a 
manual rite whose form is variable. Its function con- sists not in the 
affirmation that it produces, but in the relation that it institutes between the 
word pronounced and the potency invoked” (G. Agamben 2011:  81-82). 
 
Conclusion 
 By investigating the function and meaning of non-apophantic logos 
and identifying its three significant components, we draw the conclusion that 
singular and self-manifested utterances can be pushed and articulated in the 
field of modal ontology. Commandment, prayer or oath according to their 
structure have imperative character and are contradictory to the indicative. In 
addition, we can say that in analytic philosophical tradition, in the context of 
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speech acts theory, modal ontology has swallowed indicative ontology of 
presence. However, Agamben’s intention is absolutely different and bringing 
back into the current philosophical reflection Aristotelian non-apophantic 
logos, we wants to disclose hidden operative machine of political power, 
which is disguised by the mask of non-apophantic discourse. 
 
References: 
Agamben G. Opus Dei: An Archeology of Duty. Stanford University Press, 
2013. 
Agamben G. The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath.  
Stanford University Press. 2013. 
Giorgio Agamben G.: IL Regno e La Gloria: Per una genealogia teologica 
dell’economia e del governo, Neri Pozza Editore, 2007. 
Derrida J. The Beast and Sovereign, Volume II. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London, 2009. 
Naas M. The End Of The World and Other Teachable Moments; Jacques 
Derrida’s Final Seminar, Fordham University Press, New York, 2015. 
Agamben G. What Is to Rule? GRUNDRISSE, 2013. 
 
 
  
